SECOND DIVISION
HEIRS
OF PEDRO CLEMEÑA Y G.R. No. 155508
ZURBANO,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e
r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA
and
GARCIA, JJ.
HEIRS OF IRENE B. BIEN,
Respondents. Promulgated:
September
11, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
The only question presented in this petition for review on
certiorari[1] is
whether petitioners, the heirs of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano, should be made to pay respondents, the heirs of
Irene B. Bien, compensatory damages for depriving
them of the owner’s share of the harvest from a tract of riceland
in Bolo, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay.
This piece of land, described in Tax
Declaration No. 5299 (TD 5299) as having a surface area of more or less 20,644
square meters, was one of three lots[2] involved
in two consolidated cases[3] for
recovery of possession and ownership filed in the 1940s by respondents’
predecessor Irene Bien (through her attorney-in-fact
Gregorio Clemeña) against petitioners’
predecessor Pedro Clemeña
y Zurbano. The
pertinent averments in Irene Bien’s complaint read:
[T]he plaintiff is x
x x the absolute owner of a
parcel of land situated in the province of Albay
described and limited as follows:
“Una parcela de terreno arrozal en el sitio de Bolo,
Municipio de Tiwi, Provincia de Albay, con una extension superficial de 20,644
metros cuadrados poco mas o menos, lindante al Norte - Eulalio Copino y Esteban
Bobis; al Este – Pedro Clemeña y Conde; al Sur Canal de Ragadio y Valentina
Conde; y al Oeste – Marcial Copino, Pedro Clemeña y Valentina Conde.
Declared as Tax No.
5299 and assessed at P310.00”
[T]he plaintiff
acquired the above parcel of land by purchase from Victoriano
Napa as per deed of sale in her favor x x x; and the said Victoriano Napa
in turn acquired the same by purchase from Francisco Barrameda
who also bought the said land from the administrator of the estate of Pedro Clemeña y Conde which sale had
been duly authorized and approved by this Honorable Court in Civil Case No.
3410-In re The Estate of Pedro Clemeña y Conde x x x;
[T]he defendant ever
since he was removed as administrator of the Estate of Pedro Clemeña y Conde in the year 1939
deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the possession and use of the above
described parcel of land x x x,
and has ever since refused to relinquish the possession of the same to the
lawful owner thereof notwithstanding the fact that he has no right or any color
of title over the said land;
[B]y reason of this unlawful occupation and usurpation by the defendant, the plaintiff will suffer damages and in fact has suffered damages beginning this October 1943 harvest at the rate of 25 cavans of palay per harvest or 50 cavans yearly x x x[4]
In his answer, Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano alleged that
the land was his and that it was in his exclusive possession.[5] His
claim of ownership was similarly based on a sale by the estate of the late
Pedro Clemeña y Conde to
his predecessor-in-interest.
Neither one of the original parties lived to see
the end of the trial. The
plaintiff, Irene Bien, passed away
in 1953 and
was substituted by
respondents.[6] Not long
after that, petitioners succeeded the defendant Pedro Clemeña
y Zurbano who died in 1955.[7] The
trial lasted decades. Eventually, the cases were re-raffled to Branch 2[8] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City in
November of 1994.
On August 10, 1995, the RTC rendered
a decision[9]
declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of the land described in TD 5299 and directing
respondents to respect petitioners’ possession thereof.[10] Subsequently, however, the RTC reconsidered
its findings with respect to ownership. This time, it ruled that the contending
parties had failed to prove their respective claims of ownership and therefore
the land in question still belonged to its original owner, the estate of the
late Pedro Clemeña y Conde. Thus, in an order dated November 13, 1995,[11] the RTC
modified the dispositive portion of its decision to
read:
1. Considering that the parcel covered by [TD] No. 5299, the other parcel subject matter of Civil Case No. 115, is not included among those parcels sold by the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde to Francisco Barameda, the predecessor of the original plaintiff Irene Bien and neither
was
it included in the sale executed by Special Administrator Salustiano
Zubeldia in favor of Jesus Salazar, the
predecessor-in-interest of the defendants [petitioners], the same still forms
part of the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde. Neither the plaintiffs [respondents] nor the
defendants [petitioners] own the same.
2.
Considering that the defendants [petitioners,] in their
opposition to the motion for reconsideration, no longer disputes (sic)
the ownership of the plaintiffs [respondents] as regards the parcel covered by
[TD] No. 5681, subject matter of Civil Case No. 74, plaintiffs [respondents]
are declared the owners thereof, as stated in the decision. As regards the
claim for damages by the plaintiffs [respondents], since it was not duly
established that the defendants [petitioners] entered and occupied a portion of
said property, no damage is just the same awarded.
3.
Considering that the parcel of land covered by [TD] No.
5685 is included in the sale executed by Special Administrator Salustiano Zubeldia to Jesus
Salazar, and further considering that said deed of sale is earlier than the
sale executed in favor of Mr. Francisco Barameda, the
defendants [petitioners] are declared the owners thereof and therefore entitled
to its possession. No damages having been proved, no award concerning is
awarded (sic).
SO
ORDERED.[12]
From that order, respondents appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA). It was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50912. In a
decision dated April 4, 2002,[13] the CA
affirmed the RTC’s resolution of the issues relating
to the other two parcels of land but reversed the ruling on the ownership of
the land covered by TD 5299. It proceeded to award respondents P118,000 in damages as compensation for their having been
deprived of possession and the owner’s share in the harvest. The findings on which this award was based
were stated in the appellate court’s decision:
[T]he recovered
exhibits of the appellants [respondents] clearly indicate that ownership
thereof belongs to [them] by virtue of the following documents of sale x x x. Hence, the appellants [respondents] are the
owners of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 5299. The remaining issue to be determined is the
amount of damages sustained by appellants [respondents] from appellees’ [petitioners’] retention of possession thereof.
Gregorio Clemeña testified on the damages incurred from the appellees’ occupation of the property in the form of
deprivation of the owner’s share of the harvest, to wit:
“Q This second parcel of land described in
the SECOND cause of action which is Tax No. 5299, what kind of land is this?
A Riceland.
Q How big is this parcel of land?
A More or less, two
(2) hectares.
Q What is the average owner’s share of
the harvest?
A About fifty cavans of palay.
xxx xxx xxx
Q From the time you filed this case in
the year 1943, who had been receiving the owner’s share from this property,
known as Tax No. 5299?
A The late Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano when he was
still alive and then his children after his death.”
He likewise testified on the changes
in the price of a cavan of palay
over the years, thus:
“Q What was the current average price of palay after liberation, starting from the year 1945 up to
1950?
A About Fifteen
(P15.00) Pesos a sack.
Q How about after 1950 to 1960?
A The same.
Q How about from 1960 to 1970?
A At present,
it is Twenty Five (P25.00) Pesos per cavan.”
xxx xxx xxx
We believe, in the exercise of
discretion, that the [respondents] are entitled to an award of damages in the
amount of P118,000 computed in the following
manner: P1,500.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two
[the number of harvests in a year] multiplied by P15.00)
multiplied by 27 years (1943 to 1970) and P2,700.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two [the number of harvests in a
year] multiplied by P25.00) multiplied by 31 years (1971-2001).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly
granted in that the Order, dated November 13, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court
of Legazpi City, Branch II, in two consolidated
cases, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 74 and 155, is affirmed with the
modification that paragraph 1 is deleted and replaced with the following:
“1. Appellants [respondents] are hereby DECLARED entitled to the ownership of the property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5299.
The appellees [petitioners] and all persons
claiming under them are hereby ORDERED to vacate this tract of land immediately
and to turn over the possession of such land together with all improvements
thereon to appellants. Appellees [petitioners] are further directed to pay to
appellants [respondents] the amount of one hundred and eighteen thousand pesos
(P118,000.00), by way of actual and
compensatory damages, with legal interest thereon from the date of finality of
this decision until actual payment thereof.” [14]
Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated October 1, 2002.[15] Hence, this petition.
Petitioners no longer dispute
respondents’ ownership of the property covered by TD 5299. They insist, however, that they cannot be
held liable to respondents for the harvest because (1) they never took
possession of the property declared in TD 5299 and (2) the evidence the CA
relied on to determine the amount of damages, proceeding as it did from one of
the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a proper
basis for such an award.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioners’ contention that the land
was never in their possession should be dismissed outright for two reasons,
both of them simple and rather obvious.
First, petitioners’ predecessor Pedro
Clemeña y Zurbano alleged
in his answer that the land declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive
possession.[16] That statement, insofar as it confirmed the
allegation in the complaint that petitioners’ predecessor had retained
possession of the land in question,[17] took on
the character of a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court:
An admission, verbal
or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[18]
A judicial admission conclusively
binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The exception is
found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its
discretion and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a
party from the consequences of his admission.[19]
The rule on judicial admissions found
its way into black-letter law only in 1964[20] but its
content is supplied by case law much older and in many instances more explicit
than the present codal expression. In the early case of Irlanda
v. Pitargue,[21] this
Court laid down the doctrine that acts or facts admitted do not require proof
and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake. The rule was
more forcibly stated by Mr. Justice Street in the 1918 decision Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.:[22]
An admission made in
a pleading can not be controverted by the party
making such admission; and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the court, whether objection
is interposed by the opposite party or not.[23]
And in Cunanan
v. Amparo,[24]
the Court declared that:
the
allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive
as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary
to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.[25]
Petitioners’ newly-contrived
assertion that they were never in possession of the land cannot hold up against
these pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they were bound by the
admission of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano,
their predecessor in the litigation.[26] Without any showing that the admission was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners
cannot now contradict it.
Second, the issue of whether
petitioners ever had possession of the land is undeniably a question of fact.
Questions of this nature cannot be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari as the remedy is confined to pure questions of law.[27]
The Court is well aware, of course,
that this rule has been watered down by a slew of exceptions. Hoping to
convince the Court to reverse the CA’s findings, petitioners invoke a number of
these exceptions, namely: (1) the factual findings of the trial court and the
CA are contradictory; (2) the decision sought to be reviewed is against the law
and in complete disregard of the rules on evidence; (3) there was grave abuse
of discretion in the appreciation of facts; and (4) the CA failed to notice
relevant facts and evidence which if properly considered would justify a
different conclusion.[28] But this case does not fall within any of
these. For one, petitioners have shown
no contradiction between the findings of the CA and the RTC on the matter. And
for obvious reasons, our preceding disquisition on the conclusiveness of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano’s admission of
the fact of possession makes the rest of the grounds invoked by petitioners
undeserving of even passing consideration.
Petitioners’ next proposition, i.e.,
that Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony was self-serving
and therefore an improper basis for the damages awarded to respondents, is just
as unworthy of this Court’s favorable consideration.
“Self-serving evidence,” perhaps owing to its
descriptive formulation, is a concept much misunderstood. Not infrequently, the
term is employed as a weapon to devalue and discredit a party’s testimony
favorable to his cause. That, it seems,
is the sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is a grave error. “Self-serving evidence” is not to be taken
literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent’s interest.[29] The
term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by
a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it
does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court.[30] Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same
ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination
by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open the
door to fraud and fabrication.[31] In
contrast, a party’s testimony in court is sworn and subject to
cross-examination by the other party,[32] and
therefore, not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is
self-serving.
At any rate, for all their
protestations against the use of Gregorio Clemeña’s
testimony, petitioners never once alleged, much less tried to show, that his
testimony was inaccurate or untrue. As
already observed, petitioners’ objection is founded solely on the mere fact
that he, being a plaintiff, was a witness interested in the outcome of the
case. Now, it is true that a party’s interest may to some extent affect his
credibility as a witness.[33] To
insist otherwise would be the height of naiveté. Nonetheless, the Court cannot
subscribe to the view, implicit in petitioners’ argument, that a party’s
testimony favorable to himself must be
disregarded on account solely of his interest in the case. Our justice system will
not survive such a rule for obdurate cynicism on the part of a court is just as
odious to the administration of justice as utter gullibility.
Moreover, this Court held in National
Development Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission[34] that
interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a party’s testimony.[35]
Elsewhere it has been said that the interest of a witness does not ipso
facto deprive his testimony of probative force or require it to be
disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to
accept as much of the witness’ testimony as he finds credible and to reject the
rest.[36] To
these dicta we give our complete assent. Petitioners’ arguments to the
contrary must be rejected.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that
the appellate court committed no reversible error in relying on Gregorio Clemeña’s testimony.
The award of damages must stand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The April 4, 2002 decision and October 1, 2002 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50912 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rollo, pp. 15-29.
[2] The other two were covered by TD 5681 and TD 5685.
[3] Civil Case Nos. 74 and 115. Civil Case No. 115 is at times referred to in the pleadings and decisions of the lower courts as Civil Case No. 155.
[4] Rollo, p. 78.
[5] Id., p. 89.
[6] Her husband Gregorio Clemeña and their children Emiliana, Elena, Adela, Rodrigo, Rosario, Gregorio, Jr., Catalino, Alfredo, Gregorio I and Aurora.
[7] He was substituted by his children, Teotimo, Sr. and Clementina. Teotimo, Sr. passed away on October 11, 2001. He is survived by his spouse Zenaida and their children Rebecca C. Chan, Urduja C. Berces, Imelda C. Clemeña, Antonina C. Bron, Gabriel B. Clemeña, Teotimo B. Clemeña, Jr., and Corazon C. Ramirez.
[8] Presided over by Judge Rafael P. Santelices.
[9] Rollo, pp. 84-104.
[10] The dispositive portion of the August 10, 1995 decision read:
1. As regards the parcel of land covered by [TD] No. 5681, subject matter of Civil Case No. 74, plaintiffs [respondents] are hereby declared to be the owners of the same and are, therefore, entitled to its possession. Anyway, defendants do not claim ownership over the same and never possessed it at any time;
2. As regards the parcels of land covered by [TD Nos.] 5685 and 5299, subject matter of Civil Case No. 155, defendants [petitioners] are hereby declared to be the absolute owners thereof, considering that their predecessors-in-interest were ahead in acquiring the same from the estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde. Plaintiffs [respondents] and/or any other person or persons claiming the said parcels for and in behalf of the plaintiffs [respondents] are hereby directed to respect the rights of the defendants [petitioners,] who are in possession of the lands.
No damage is awarded, as the Court finds no basis for granting the same.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. Id., pp. 103-104.
[11] Id., pp. 106-114.
[12] Id., pp. 113-114.
[13] Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired) and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals. id., pp. 31-55.
[14] Id.,
pp. 51-54.
[15] Id.,
pp. 57-58.
[16] Supra
note 5.
[17] Supra
note 4.
[18] Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 4.
[19] Jovito Salonga, Philippine Law of Evidence 121 (1958 ed.) Regina Publishing Company.
[20] Rules of Court (1964), Rule 129, Sec. 2.
[21] 22 Phil. 383 (1912).
[22] 38 Phil. 634 (1918).
[23] Id. at 646. Reiterated in Joe’s Radio and Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 104 Phil. 333 (1958) and Santiago v. De los Santos, 158 Phil. 809 (1974).
[24] 80 Phil. 227 (1948).
[25] Id., p. 232.
[26] See 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 302.
[27] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
[28] Rollo, p. 202.
[29] See Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 813 (1995).
[30] 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 216.
[31] National Development Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 126 Phil. 226 (1967).
[32] Id., p. 231.
[33] Id.
[34] 126 Phil. 226 (1967).
[35] Id.
[36] 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1031 (2)